This sandbox uses the one-round mode of the method: build voter profiles (or load an example), then compute to see live the duel matrix, the bipartisan set and the normalized approval that decides the winner. Nothing is saved.
More informationA beats everyone head-to-head: elected immediately, no second round.
A>B, B>C, C>A: no winner. The whole cycle forms the bipartisan set (lottery ⅓ each).
No cycle, yet no Condorcet winner: A and B are exactly tied. Both stay in the set.
C2 mimics C everywhere: the clone is ignored, the outcome does not change.
A, B, C cycle; D loses every duel. D is excluded, the cycle goes to the lottery.
D beats A but is a sub-clone of C: D is in the Smith set, NOT in the bipartisan set.
Each candidate beats the next two: a perfectly symmetric paradox, lottery ⅕ each.
A and B are tied AND caught in a cycle with C and D — the hardest case for a tally.
Everyone votes honestly: B is the Condorcet winner and is elected.
The two A-supporters bury B under C: they create a cycle… and now their worst choice C can win (⅓). Strategy is risky.